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Abstract— We investigate in this paper the access selection 
and joint pricing problem in multi-operator wireless networks. 
The problem is formulated as a Stackelberg game, where 
cooperating service operators first set the service price to 
maximize their revenue. Then, the home operator of the mobile 
user performs the access selection process among the service 
operators, in order to maximize its own profits and its client 
satisfaction, in terms of perceived QoS. Competing operators 
decide the service price following a number of defined pricing 
schemes, and the home operator uses a hybrid utility function for 
the selection decision. We consider the Nash equilibrium as a 
solution of the service price setting game, where the best response 
is presented in function of the adopted pricing scheme. 
Simulation results show the efficiency of this multi-leader 
follower game for the access selection in a multi-operator 
environment, and illustrate how operators’ cooperation enhances 
network performance and improves operators’ revenue. 
Keywords— Multi-operator sharing networks; cooperation, 
multi-leader follower game; access selection; service pricing; Nash 
equilibrium. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The mobile traffic broadband is growing in a fast manner, 
facing network operators with the challenge of expanding 
capacity and enhancing the Quality of Service (QoS) of their 
communication networks. Multi-operators cooperation in the 
form of open access has been proposed in a number of large 
research projects like ANWIRE, SPICE, Ambient Networks, 
etc. [1]. The cooperation of wireless network operators in a 
sharing environment is also introduced in [2] as a cost 
effective network solution to expand capacity and improve 
operators’ profitability. In fact, network sharing is widely used 
in WLAN systems where local access providers offer wireless 
access to service providers. A similar structure exists in 
cellular networks where Mobile Virtual Network Operator 
(MVNO) provides mobile services without having a mobile 
network of their own. Multi-operator solutions are introduced 
for shared small cells as for macro cellular networks, within 
different business models including inter-connection provider 
or a third party local operator [3] [4].  
Indeed, current 3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) 
standards fully support network sharing between operators 
under different sharing schemes. With the latest advancements 
introduced in LTE-Advanced systems [5], spectrum sharing is 
feasible efficiently. Furthermore, new mobile architecture 
arises in order to help operator upgrading their networks, and 
enable network sharing in a Cloud Radio Access Network (C-
RAN). In C-RAN, baseband processing is centralized and 
shared among sites in a virtualized Baseband Units (BBU) 
Pool. The latter can be shared by different network operators, 
allowing them to rent Radio Access Network (RAN) as a 
cloud service [6].  
In our work, we consider a cooperative environment where 
wireless network operators share their radio resources, to 
upgrade their networks’ capacity and improve performance in 
terms of clients’ rejection and QoS degradation. In this multi-
operator environment, when an operator is unable to satisfy 
his client, he tries to give him access to the service through 
another network operator, thus avoiding his rejection. In 
addition, in order to preserve the transparency of the 
transaction, the mobile user payment goes to his home 
operator, and the latter must pay a service price (transaction 
cost) to the new access operator. This cooperation model was 
introduced first in [7] and [8].  
In this paper, we model the interaction between the 
wireless operators as a multi-leader-follower (Stackelberg) 
game. Available service operators announce their transaction 
cost in the first stage and the home operator of the transferred 
user performs the selection decision in the second stage. The 
decision of the home operator is based on the service 
operators’ transaction cost (service price) and the delivered 
QoS parameters. Service operators select the service price that 
maximizes their revenue, keeping in mind the impact of their 
prices on the home operator profit gain. For a service operator 
the best response is the price scheme maximizing his global 
profits. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II 
presents some existing work related to access selection and 
joint pricing using game theory. Section III presents our multi-
leader-follower game and the adopted pricing schemes are 
described in section IV. Section V shows simulation results for 
the efficiency of the selection decision using our Stackelberg 
game formulation, and elaborates the optimal pricing scheme 
for the transaction cost decision. Finally, we conclude in 
section VI. 
II. BACKGROUNG AND RELATED WORKS 
In a multi-operator sharing environment, two important 
issues are to be studied: Access selection and joint service 
pricing.  For the access selection, a hybrid decision must 
achieve the highest revenue for the network operator while 
guaranteeing the maximum satisfaction of the mobile users 
from the service usage.  Accordingly, various mathematical 
tools can be used as for the selection decision in single operator 
networks [9-12], such as utility and cost function theory [7-
8][13], multiple attribute decision making (MADM) [7], fuzzy 
logic [14-15] and  game theory[13][17-20]. Moreover, 
operators compete with each other to offer wireless access 
services through price adjustment. In general, competitive 
pricing is formulated as a non-cooperative game, and the most 
popular solution is the Nash equilibrium concept [17-20]. 
Besides, most of the existing works in multi-operator 
network environment use game theory for the access selection 
and the joint service pricing. In [17], authors applied a non-
cooperative game using Leader–follower model (Stackelberg 
game) in order to study the competition between two ISPs. 
With a simple QoS model a Nash equilibrium point was found 
from which the two ISPs would not move without 
cooperation.  Leader-follower game model is used again in 
[18] for competitive pricing in heterogeneous wireless access 
networks, between the WiMAX and WiFi service providers. 
Authors showed that when competing service providers make 
their decision in a simultaneous-play the best response can be 
obtained as in the Bertrand game model with the Nash 
equilibrium. But, when a service provider is defined as a 
leader and it makes the price decision before the other service 
providers, the solution moves to the Stackelberg equilibrium 
which is always the best response of the follower service 
providers. In cognitive radio networks [19], Nash equilibrium 
concept is used to find the optimal price in a Stackelberg game 
between primary and secondary operators and Wardrop 
equilibrium is determined for the network selection game. 
Authors reveal the advantage for primary operator to play 
before the secondary operator, particularly in a high-traffic 
regime. Furthermore, a two-stage multi-leader-follower game 
is used to model the interaction of a number of wireless 
providers and a group of atomic users in [20].  Authors 
showed that the provider competition leads to a unique 
socially optimal resource allocation for a broad class of utility 
functions and a generic channel model. A new ―flex  service‖ 
paradigm is introduced in [13],  it allows a mobile user to 
dynamically access base stations BSs of different providers 
based on various criteria, such as profile, network conditions 
and offered prices. ―Flex users‖ can select the appropriate 
provider and BS on a per-session basis. Authors presented two 
modeling framework for the access markets at both 
microscopic and macroscopic levels.  At macroscopic level, 
users are considered as a homogeneous population with 
respect to preferences and decision-making mechanism. In 
such model, the behavior of users is described by a population 
game in order to determine how the entire user population 
reacts to the decision of providers.   
 All works listed above for joint pricing and access 
selection consider the price that service provider or network 
operator offer for the mobile users. In this paper, we are 
studying the service price that operators set for the user 
transaction from one operator to another. This price is 
transparent for the users and it is charged to the home operator 
of a transferred user. The envisaged mobile market is more 
open than ―Flex service‖ market for mobile users, since it does 
not need any previous subscription as a ―Flex user‖. Besides, 
it is controlled by the home operator decision; the user is not 
free to switch between operators.  Other works [14] [15] based 
on fuzzy theory for access selection, proposed different 
business models for price sharing.  
In this paper we model the interaction between network 
operators as a Stackelberg game in order to find the optimal 
pricing scheme to adopt for the service price setting of inter-
operator users’ transaction. The available service operators for 
the selection are considered as leaders and the home operator 
of the transferred user is the follower.  
III. STACKELBERG GAME FORMULATION 
We consider a simultaneous-play and a two stages leader-
follower game where N network operators are the players. In 
the first stage of the game, the strategy of a player is the service 
price per unit of bandwidth for the transaction cost (denoted by 
Csi). The payoff for each player is its profit denoted by πi. This 
profit is calculated based on the revenue obtained from own 
clients, the transaction cost and the revenue obtained from the 
guest users. A simulation framework similar to the microscopic 
level framework used in [12] and described in [4] is adopted to 
obtain the values of achieved payoff for each player. In the 
second stage of the game where prices Cs=[Cs1 Cs2…CsN-1 ] 
are known , the home operator choose a service operator that 
maximizes its new payoff , which is the utility of the 
transferred user added to the transaction profit. This payoff is 
given by: 
Uh(Csi)= Wu *Uu+ Wop *(p-Csi)                    
Where, Uu is the transferred user utility function. This utility 
function is a combination of different QoS parameters offered 
by an access network [16]. We use Simple Additive 
Weighting Method (SAW) to obtain it for non-real time 
service users as follow [16]: 
 
Uu=WJ *JM+W D*DM+W BW*BWR+ WB* BERM    

And we use Multiplicative Exponential Weighting Method 
(MEW) for real time service users as follow [16]: 
 
Uu =JM
W J
*DM
W D
 *BWR
W BW
* BERM
WB                        
Given JM is the mean of the jitter, DM is the mean of the end-
to-end delay,   BWR is the remaining bandwidth and BERM is 
the mean of the loss rate measured on the service operator 
network. These parameters are normalized and associated to 
their corresponding preference weights WJ, WD, WBW and WB 
respectively, associated to each service class. In addition, p is 
the price that the transferred user pays for the home operator 
such that (p-Cs) is the home operator profit from the 
transaction. And, the weights Wu and Wop are the degree of 
important for the user satisfaction in terms of QoS and the 
operator satisfaction in terms of profits, respectively. 
Equilibrium strategies 
Consider that Home operator faces Cs in stage II. This 
operator makes the decision for access selection in order to 
maximize Uh(Cs). The best response of this stage is to select 
the service operator that maximizes both the user and the 
home operator satisfaction in terms of QoS and profits 
respectively. 
In stage I, the optimal choice of prices for the transaction 
cost depends on the home operator reaction and its selection 
decision. The best response of a service operator i is the 
optimal price Csi
*
 for which profit πi(Csi
*
,Csj) is maximized 
given the price Csj offered by the other serving operator. 
When available service operators offer their prices 
simultaneously, Nash equilibrium gives the set of prices such 
that none of the operators can increase the profit by choosing a 
different price, given the price offered by the other service 
operator. For the set of price strategies, we consider six 
different pricing schemes described in the following section, 
the output of the game for each strategy is Cs=[Cs1 Cs2…CsN-1 
]. A utility space (πi, πj) is used to plot different payoff curves 
for each price strategy [18], in order to deduce the outcomes 
of the pricing game between each pair of operators. 
IV. PRICING SCHEMES 
 
A. Scheme S1 
To prevent any loss of investment, a guest user must 
generate the same revenue from a client. Thus, the transaction 
cost is set equal to the user price Cs
1
i=pi. 
B. Scheme S2:  
We may notice, in S1, that an operator having the cheapest 
service price will pay a high price for its client transfer and 
gain less from guest users. It may cause losses in sporadic 
cases where this transfer is frequent. Thus, in this scheme, we 
propose that Cs
2
=maxi(pi)  i=1,2,3…  
C. Scheme S3:  
In scheme S2 the price agreed for Cs guarantee more 
revenues from guest users but it causes losses for client 
transaction. To improve users’ acceptance, an operator may 
perform a high rate of user’s transaction, which causes a lot of 
charges in S2. Operators may find better to pay less and get 
less than pay more. Thus, S3 proposes a price Cs
3
=mini(pi)     
i=1,2,3…  
D. Price Sharing scheme ( pShare):  
With price sharing S-op takes a share from the payment of 
the transferred user. Thus, H-op will keep (1-α)p, and S-op 
will get αp, where α≥0. Depending on the value of α, different 
sub-schemes can be envisaged: 
1) Scheme pShare1: In this scheme, α=1, i.e, S-op gets all 
the revenue from user transfer.  
 
2) Scheme pShare-: In this scheme, we choose α<1 and 
without loss of generality we simulate α=0.5. 
 
3) Scheme pShare+: This scheme is a penalizing model 
where α>1. H-op must pay to insure his client service. 
Without loss of generality, we choose α=1.25 for the 
simulation. 
V. SIMULATION RESULTS 
A. Simulation Setup 
We consider three cooperating operators, Op1, Op2 and 
Op3 each managing a single Radio Access Technology as in 
Fig.1. All managed RATs are supposed capable of delivering 
a constant value for the mean jitter JM, mean delay DM and 
mean bit error rate BERM. The delivered parameters for each 
operator are depicted in Table I. 
Users arrive in the system sequentially and we model the 
arrival and departure of users as a Poisson Process with mean 
arrival interval 1/λ seconds. We perform simulation for 
different values taken from 1/λ= [6.67 5 4.44 4 3.63 3.33 
3.076].Once connected, the user will stay in the system for a 
certain service time, assumed to follow an exponential 
distribution of mean 1/μ=4min. During this service time, the 
user will consume a constant bit rate. Note that no scheduling 
is considered. And, at the end of the connection, the user will 
leave the system improving the available bandwidth of the 
serving operator. The simulations are done by Matlab for 
duration of 1200 seconds each and repeated for 70 
experiments. 
TABLE I.  NETWORK PARAMETERS  
Network 
operator 
QoS Parameters 
Bandwidth(Kb/s) Jitter(ms) Delay(ms) BER(dB) 
Op1 1700 6 19 10-3 
Op2 11000 10 30 10-5 
Op3 5500 10 45 10-5 
 
Op1 Op2 Op3 
CRRM 
Third Party 
RRM1 RRM2 RRM3 
T1 T2 T3 
 
Fig. 1.Multi-operators mono-technology environment. 
 
B. Equilibrium pricing scheme 
The complexity of the Stackelberg game defined in section 
III arises from: the number of players (three operators) with 
two stages multi-leader follower play, the interchange of the 
leader follower roles (an operator can be a service operator in 
some states and a home operator transferring its user in 
another state) and the number of price strategies in stage I. 
For simplification, we assume that all players in stage I 
adopt the same pricing scheme for the transaction cost 
settings. And the game solution is given as function of the 
adopted pricing scheme. The maximization problem in stage II 
is solved by simulation for each pricing strategy of stage II. 
Resulting payoffs (global achieved profits) for each players 
are taken from simulations output and plotted is the utility 
space (πi, πj) to find the equilibrium strategy. Nash 
equilibrium solution is found for each pair of players in stage 
I. Nash equilibrium point gives the set of prices such that none 
of the operators can increase the profit by choosing a different 
price, given the price offered by the other service operator. 
The best response (equilibrium pricing scheme) is found for 
Op1-Op2 play and Op1-Op3 play and Fig. 2 and 3 
respectively. For every price strategy, we obtain a curve in the 
space (πi, πj), we plot six curves corresponding to each pricing 
scheme. For each price Csi offered by the service operator i, 
the second player choose Csj in order to maximize its profit, 
such point corresponds to the tangent point of the vertical lines 
with the curve corresponding to Csi. Connecting these points 
yields the dashed curve in Fig.2 and 3, representing the 
outcomes of the game for different prices. The best response 
of the game corresponds to the maximum point of the dashed 
curve.  
Fig.2 represents the profit of Op2, π2, in function of the 
profit of Op1, π1, for each strategy. For each strategy (pricing 
scheme) we find the points that maximize Op2 payoff. Next, 
we connect these points and determine the maximum of the 
resulting curve. This maximum corresponds to the Nash 
equilibrium point where none of the operators can increase the 
profit by choosing a different price, without affecting the 
profit of the other player. The best response of Op1-Op2 game 
is reach with pShare- scheme. 
Fig.3 represents the profit of Op3, π3, in function of the 
profit of Op1, π1, for each strategy. Similarly, the best 
response of Op1-Op3 game is reach with pShare- scheme. 
Since both equilibriums are reached for the same pricing 
scheme, pShare- is adopted as the solution of Op1, Op2 and 
Op3 multi-leader follower game. 
C. Selection game efficiency 
In the following, we study the system behavior with the 
best response pricing scheme pShare-. The efficiency of the 
selection game is shown through blocking rates improvement 
and the profits gains achieved via cooperation.  
 
1) Global blocking rates 
Figure 4 shows the improvement of the global blocking rates 
of the system formed by Op1, Op2 and Op3. Results show 
that with cooperation, the access system is able to maintain a 
blocking rate below 2%. Mobile users’ acceptance is increase 
by 18% for high arrival rates. 
 
 
Fig 4. Global blocking rates reduction with cooperation. 
 
 
 
Fig 2. Op1and Op2 play equilibrium at pShare-.   
 
Fig 3. Op1 and Op3 play equilibrium at pShare-.       
 
2) Operators’ blocking rates 
Figure 5a, 5b, 5c show the blocking rate variations after 
cooperation, for each operator of the system Op1, Op2 and 
Op3 respectively. Operators could improve intensively their 
RAT blocking rates, especially the operators deploying a 
limited capacity as for Op1. The latter could improve the 
number of served users through cooperation by 50%. Even 
though, the operator deploys a high capacity, blocking rates 
are reduced and limited below 0.2 %, as for Op2.  
 
3) Operators’ profits  
Figure 6 shows profit variation for each operator before and 
after cooperation. In fact, the capacity gain achieved through 
operators’ cooperation is translated into profit gain. New 
incomes are available from guests and transferred clients. The 
important increase of the user acceptance for Op1 brought 
more revenues. Op2 also benefits from profit amelioration; 
additional incomes are achieved from serving guest users 
transferred from Op1 and Op3 networks. For Op3 slight profit 
improvement is noticed because this operator exchanges users 
rarely. This operator benefits from cooperation explicitly, by 
avoiding resource underutilization. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Pricing in multi-operator wireless network is an important 
issue not only to maximize operators’ revenue, but also to 
allocate resources efficiently. In this paper, we model the 
interaction between wireless operators as a multi-leader-
follower (Stackelberg) game. Cooperating service operators 
announce their transaction cost in the first stage and the home 
operator of the transferred user performs the selection decision 
in the second stage. The transaction cost price is set following 
six different predefined pricing schemes. The game solution is 
found using Nash equilibrium concept, and the best response 
is determine for every pairs of leaders. Results for three 
cooperating operators showed that sharing the half of the user 
payment solves the competition between the operators when 
one of the leaders is an operator with limited capacity and 
starves for cooperation to enhance its network performance.  
Future works will upgrade this multi-leader-follower game 
with independent strategies. Dynamic pricing will be adopted 
where each player choses the service price independently of 
the other operator decision, in order to maximize their payoffs.  
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